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What Prohibition Teaches About Guns and
Abortion: How Alcohol Can Save Individual Rights
Jesse D.H. Snyder*
I. INTRODUCTION
David Bowie once reflected, whether we like it or not, whether we
know it or not, time changes us all: “Time may change me. But you can’t
trace time.”1 A women’s right to terminate a pregnancy through abortion
and the right to bear arms are two sides of the same coin because of time.
The rights are polarizing with dissimilar footholds in the Constitution.
Those in favor of one right are generally opposed to the other right.2 Yet
because they are individual rights recognized by the Supreme Court, they
are entwined like a double helix, resisting repulsion under a latent precept:
reliance. In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court prescribed the right
for women to choose to terminate their pregnancies through abortion.3
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed that
individual right in 1992,4 and Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt did the
same in 2016.5 This unenumerated right rests in the Due Process Clause of
*2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2016–2017 to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Jesse earned his J.D., summa cum
laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and his B.S. from the United States Air Force
Academy. While in law school, he served as editor in chief of the Texas Wesleyan Law
Review. After graduating from law school, he clerked for the Honorable Jorge A. Solis of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Jesse would like to
thank Amy Depuy, Tyra Singleton, Alice Kwak, and the entire staff of the Hastings
Women’s Law Journal. Finally, he would like to thank and recognize his wife, Amy, for her
enduring support and strength as a proud patriot and advocate for equal rights.
1. DAVID BOWIE, Changes, on HUNKY DORY (Trident Studies 1972).
2. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Last night’s presidential debate: The Supreme Court and the
candidates, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/10/last-nights-presidential-debate-the-supreme-court-and-the-candidates/.
3. Stephen
Wermiel, SCOTUS
for
law
students: Roe
v.
Wade and
precedent, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2016, 1:55 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/
scotus-for-law-students-roe-v-wade-and-precedent/; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164
(1973).
4. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted).
5. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
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the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller,
the Supreme Court concluded that an individual has the right to possess a
handgun in the home for self-defense.7 In 2010, McDonald v. City of
Chicago applied that individual right against the states.8 The right to bear
arms is, of course, housed in the Second Amendment.9 Although the two
rights may seem discordant, like all individual rights recognized by the
Supreme Court, they derive value and meaning by affording an individual
the ability to push back against state action in derogation of those rights.
The creation and enablement of an individual right gives rise to reliance
that that right will endure among the oscillating panoply of other rights
already dedicated to the public.10
Doubtless the Supreme Court can overrule constitutional precedent, but
a study of jurisprudence in the area of individual rights reveals scant
decisions that recognized an individual right and then scuttled expectations
by expunging that right from the public.11 If the Supreme Court were to
consider negating the rights recognized in Roe and Heller, it must contend
with the due-process consequences of upsetting the settled expectations of
individuals.12 Advocates in favor of either Roe or Heller have the
challenge of explaining how excising individual rights impacts society writ
large. Proponents of individual rights must be creative, directing the
Court’s attention to extrajudicial sources amid a dearth of apposite judicial
decisions. And for that, Prohibition offers a glimpse into a world laboring
in the absence of a once-recognized right. How society behaved during the
only time a constitutional amendment was ratified and then repealed is
instructive of what might happen if gun or abortion rights vanish.13
This paper argues that advocates should use the documented history of
Prohibition to argue why courts should be circumspect before overruling
decisions recognizing individual rights. In three parts, the paper outlines
how the 2016 presidential election stirred frisson among proponents and
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”)
7. Amy Howe, Last night’s presidential debate: The Supreme Court and the candidates,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/last-nightspresidential-debate-the-supreme-court-and-the-candidates/; District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
8. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (controlling opinion).
9. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“In sum, we hold that the
District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does
its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of
immediate self-defense.”).
10. Akhil Amar, The Court after Scalia: The despicable and dispensable exclusionary
rule (Corrected), SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16, 2016, 1:57 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-the-despicable-and-dispensable-exclusionary-rule/.
11. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–63 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
12. See Amar, supra, note 10.
13. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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opponents of abortion and gun rights, discusses how Prohibition is apt
when considering the effects of curtailing individual rights, and concludes
by asserting that due process requires courts to adhere to precedent when
individuals develop a reliance interest on recognized individual rights. In
the end, alcohol may be the elixir that saves abortion and gun rights.

II. THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE
WEAPONIZING OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Court opinions on gun control and access to abortion procedures are
politicized issues that never seem to settle.14 Inveighers against those rights
most likely take comfort in Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s remarks that “no
case is ever finally decided until it is rightly decided.”15 But this position
begs the question of when can individuals ever feel secure in recognized
individual rights when each new justice on the Supreme Court invites “a
[renewed] battle for the meaning of the Constitution”?16 Unlike abortion
and gun control, same-sex marriage, interestingly, seems secure even
though disagreement persists on its legal firmness.17
Roe and Heller transcend normative voting issues. The decisions have
fomented advocacy groups and million-dollar industries dedicated to the
preservation or eradication of the rights those cases have come to
represent.18 Money goes, in part, to persuade voters why one cause is
virtuous and the other leads to bedlam.19 The perception that Roe and
Heller are fragile is buttressed by expenditures: causes attempting to
persuade that either decision is correct outspend causes attempting to
undermine the recognized right.20
Parsing the legal reasons that moor the recognition of the right to own a
handgun in the home for self-defense and the right to terminate a
14. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Might the Supreme Court overrule its
own gun rights ruling? NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Sept. 22, 2016), http://blog.
constitutioncenter.org/2016/09/constitution-check-might-the-supreme-court-overrule-itsown-gun-rights-ruling/; See Wermiel, supra, note 3.
15. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193, 223 (1952) (quoting Justice Brandeis that “no case is ever finally decided until it is
rightly decided”).
16. Michael Dorf, Symposium: The wages of guerrilla warfare against
abortion, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
symposium-the-wages-of-guerrilla-warfare-against-abortion/.
17. See Wermiel, supra, note 3; Ryan Anderson, Symposium: Judicial activism on
marriage causes harm: What does the future hold?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2015, 4:28
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-ryan-anderson/.
18. See, e.g., Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: Comparing Spending by Gun Rights and Gun
Control Interest Groups, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 31, 2012, 8.59 AM), https://www.pro
publica.org/article/by-the-numbers-comparing-spending-by-gun-rights-and-gun-controlinterest-gr; Steven Ertelt, $37M Spent on Election Abortion Ads, Pro-Lifers Outspent 3-1,
LIFENEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2012/11/15/37m-spenton-election-abortion-ads-pro-lifers-outspent-3-1/.
19. Id.
20. See, supra, note 18.
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pregnancy through abortion does not explain in full why people care about
these issues. Commentators suggest that, although progressives would
much like to overturn Heller, their chief aim is to restrict access to weapons
as a means to promote public safety.21 To them, Heller threatens the
prospect of a safe society irrespective of whether the right to bear arms has
a foothold as a collective right or individual right.22 As for a woman’s right
to an abortion, commentators likewise conclude that “Roe’s continued
uncertain status as settled precedent must lie outside legal reasoning”:
Many commentators have observed that a variety of interest groups
have gained and exerted political traction by using the issue of
abortion as an organizing principle and rallying point. The
intersection of anti-abortion political movements with pro-life
moral values and religious teachings by the Catholic Church and
others may have added to the power of the issue as a political
rallying cry. A number of state legislatures have stoked the debate
over abortion rights by annually passing new abortion restrictions
or even partial or near-total bans, some clearly designed as vehicles
for the court to reconsider Roe.23
Public disagreement with Roe and Heller is not so much about
constitutional law as it is about extrajudicial values.
During the 2016 presidential election, those two rights received
outsized attention.24 Amid the omnipresent vacancy on the Supreme Court,
both candidates used the rights as unexpurgated rallying cries, suggesting
that the election will secure the vitality of one right and presage the demise
of the other.25 Scholars feared the same:
If Justice Scalia is replaced by someone who favors abortion rights,
Roe v. Wade will be more secure than it has been in decades. If
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kennedy are replaced by Hillary
Clinton, abortion rights will be protected for decades to come and
the court likely will revisit some of its rulings that allowed
restrictions on abortions. But conversely, if even two of these four
seats are replaced by Donald Trump, it seems certain that there
would be five votes to greatly limit abortion rights and I believe to
overrule Roe v. Wade.

21. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION
CENTER, https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-ii/
the-reasonable-right-to-bear-arms-adam-winkler/interp/2 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
22. See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, The Refounding Father, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
(June 5, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/06/05/justice-stevens-refoundingfather/.
23. See Wermiel, supra, note 3.
24. Howe, supra, note 7.
25. Id.
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Again, the current court is likely split 4-4 on the meaning of the
Second Amendment. A Hillary Clinton victory would mean a
court that is unlikely to extend gun rights and very well might
overrule Heller and McDonald. A Donald Trump presidency
would create a court committed to these decisions and would be
likely to strike down many other laws regulating firearms.26
But is fear a justifiable response? Is one right guaranteed to ascend, while
the other is consigned to an inflection point toward demise? Certainly, the
Supreme Court can overrule precedent. Still, in 239 years, the Court has
overruled one of its constitutional decisions only 95 times.27 Instances
when the Court purged an individual right are vanishing small.

III. WHAT PROHIBITION, MORE THAN ANY COURT
DECISION, TEACHES ABOUT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Prohibition—not prior decisions—serves as the most appropriate
model of what would happen if the Supreme Court overruled Roe or Heller.
When the Court last scrutinized whether an individual right should be
overruled in favor of state legislation, it could muster only two cases to
demonstrate how widespread debate undermined past legitimacy: Lochner
v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson.28
Lochner “imposed substantive limitations on legislation limiting
economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation.”29 When the
Court overruled the substantive right to contract, the right was hardly an
individual right because collective institutions used Lochner as a means to
propagate unregulated, profit-maximizing behavior to the detriment of
social welfare.30 Lochner stood more for inhibiting regulation than for
enabling individuals the freedom to contract. No uprisings about the loss
of the right to contract occurred because individual welfare, in the Court’s
view, depended on some market regulation.31
Plessy implicated the infamous “separate-but-equal rule for applying
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.”32 As the Court
reflected, “whatever may have been the understanding in Plessy’s time of
26. Erwin Chemerinski, Chemerinsky: What will the presidential election mean for
SCOTUS?, ABA JOURNAL (Sept. 6, 2016, 7:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/chemerinsky_what_will_the_coming_election_mean_for_scotus.
27. Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Might the Supreme Court overrule its own gun
rights ruling?, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Sept. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitution
center.org/2016/09/constitution-check-might-the-supreme-court-overrule-its-own-gunrights-ruling/.
28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 861–62.
29. Id. at 861 (citation omitted).
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Casey, 505 U.S at 862 (citation omitted).
32. Id. (citation omitted).
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the power of segregation to stigmatize those who were segregated with a
‘badge of inferiority,’ it was clear by 1954 that legally sanctioned
segregation had just such an effect, to the point that racially separate public
educational facilities were deemed inherently unequal.”33 Plessy is
anathema to individual rights, elevating collective-institutional
justifications for segregation in denigration of the rights secured through
the Reconstruction Amendments.
The aftermath of Lochner and Plessy had nothing to do with
individuals coping with a loss of recognized rights; those cases represented
improvement of individual rights. In the absence of case law evidencing
what happens when a recognized right is removed from the public,
Prohibition is an exemplar for when the public enjoys a right later taken
away.
During the 1820s, a wave of religious revivalism ignited the
temperance movement.34 In 1838, Massachusetts passed a temperance law
banning the sale of spirits in less than 15-gallon quantities.35 Maine passed
the first state prohibition law in 1846, and several states followed suit by
the time the Civil War began in 1861.36
The temperance movement gained momentum after the Civil War,
avowing to fight “the perceived evils linked with alcoholic beverages.”37
In 1880, Kansas became the first state to pass a constitutional provision that
prohibited the production and sale of alcohol.38 The Supreme Court upheld
the law because “it is not a determination for the courts, upon their views as
to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative
determination on that question.”39 In 1888, the Court narrowed that
decision through the Commerce Clause, holding that states could not
regulate liquor sales unless and until transportation of the liquor terminated
in that forum.40 In 1890, Congress responded by passing the Wilson Act,
which gave states the power to regulate the importation of liquor to the
same degree as they regulated in-state liquor:
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use,
33. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863 (citation omitted).
34. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Autumn R. Veatch, Comment, Where Does the Commerce Clause End and the
Twenty-first Amendment Begin Under Bainbridge v. Turner?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 111,
116 (2004).
38. See Russ Miller, Note, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and
State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2495,
2504 (2001).
39. Matthew B. Mills, Note, Let History Be Our Guide: Using Historical Analogies to
Analyze State Response to a Post-Granholm Era, 81 IND. L.J. 1097, 1100 (2006) (citations
omitted).
40. Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 499 (1888).
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consumption, sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such
State or Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws
of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police
powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such
liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and
shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced
therein in original packages or otherwise.41
Eight years later, the Supreme Court again scuttled Congress’s efforts,
concluding that the Wilson Act did not cover mail-order alcohol.42 As a
result, “[m]ail order booze, of course, flourished.”43 Temperance advocates
remained undeterred, persuading Congress in 1913 to pass the WebbKenyon Act, which prohibited the importation of liquor into any state with
the intent to violate the laws of that state.44 The Webb-Kenyon Act struck
similar tones with what became Section two of the Eighteenth Amendment:
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means
whatsoever, of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one
State . . . into any other State . . . or from any foreign country into
any State . . . which said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by any
person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any
manner used . . . in violation of any law of such State . . . is hereby
prohibited.45
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1917,
two years before the beginning of nationalized Prohibition.46 By that point,
World War I had exacerbated xenophobia against the German brewing
industry, leading one temperance politician to exclaim, “And the worst of
all our German enemies, the most treacherous, the most menacing, are
Pabst, Schlitz, Blatz and Miller.”47
Ratified on January 16, 1919, the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited
the making, transporting, and selling of alcoholic beverages. 48 Proponents
of the movement, in a manner eerily similar to the advocacy against Roe
and Heller, exhorted that temperance would reduce crime and corruption,

41. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2002)).
42. Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment
Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first
Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2004) (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 1569.
44. Webb-Kenyon Act, Pub. L. No. 68-398, 37 Stat. 699 (1913).
45. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2.
46. James S. Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
47. Evan Andrews, 10 Things You Should Know About Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16,
2015), http://www.history.com/news/10-things-you-should-know-about-prohibition.
48. Annenberg Classroom, Prohibition of Liquor, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xviii
(last
visited on Dec. 13, 2016); U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
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decrease the need for welfare and prisons, and improve the health and
welfare of Americans.49
Agitation for repeal sparked “almost from the time [the Eighteenth
Amendment] was adopted.”50
Accounts attribute the Eighteenth
Amendment to driving underground the lucrative alcohol business, creating
a pervasive black market.51 According to some reports, “[i]t was only
slightly more difficult to buy liquor under Prohibition than it had been prior
to its passage.”52 Evidence shows that Prohibition encouraged disrespect
for the law and strengthened organized crime.53 Several states refused to
enforce the Eighteenth Amendment.54 New York City boasted more than
30,000 speakeasies, and Detroit’s alcohol trade was second only to the auto
industry in contribution to its economy.55 Chicago gangster Al Capone
earned $60 million annually from bootleg operations and speakeasies.56
Illegal operations fueled a corresponding rise in gang violence, including
the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in Chicago in 1929, in which several men
dressed as policemen killed a group from an enemy gang.57
Against gangsters bootlegging and concomitant government
corruption, President Warren G. Harding declared that Prohibition had
devolved into a “nationwide scandal.”58 The upshot of Prohibition
included its disproportionate effect on the nation’s working class and poor
because the high price of bootleg liquor margined out all but middle- and
upper-class Americans.59 Costs for law enforcement, jails, and prisons
spiraled upward.60 Estimates suggest that more than 10,000 people died of
tainted booze during Prohibition.61
Prohibition ended with the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment
on December 5, 1933.62 In New Orleans, as the story goes, the occasion
was honored with 20 minutes of celebratory cannon fire.63 According to
another apocryphal tale, President Franklin D. Roosevelt marked the
occasion by downing a dirty martini.64 Although a few states continued to
49. Classroom, supra, note 48.
50. Rutkin v. Reinfeld, 229 F.2d 248, 255 (2d Cir. 1956).
51. Classroom, supra, note 48.
52. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 283–84 (2004).
53. Classroom, supra, note 48.
54. Andrews, supra, note 47.
55. Id.
56. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition.
57. Id.
58. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BUREAU OF PROHIBITION 46 (1929).
59. Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition.
60. Id.
61. Andrews, supra, note 47.
62. Simpkins v. United States, 78 F.2d 594, 595 (4th Cir. 1935); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI.
63. Andrews, supra, note 47.
64. Id.
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prohibit alcohol after Prohibition, all had abandoned the movement by
1966.65 The “noble experiment” failed.66
Prohibition marks the only time that the states ratified a constitutional
amendment only to repeal it after experience.67 This unsuccessful foray,
although initially approved by three-fourths of the states,68 illustrates what
happens when rights assumed to be retained by the people cease to exist.
Instead of referring to the epoch as an effective execution of the
constitutional amendment process, history labels the period as a failure.69
Prohibition teaches that, when purged of an individual right, people carry
on as if they still retain the right notwithstanding state action to the
contrary. Confidence in governmental institutions erodes, and respect for
the rule of law falls to a nadir.
Prohibition demonstrates that worries over underground arsenals, rebel
uprisings, back-alley abortions, and civil disobedience are realistic if Roe
and Heller are overruled. This is not to incite fear or create panic. Rather,
the conclusion acknowledges the uneasy lawlessness that suffused
Prohibition. If the Supreme Court or a committed three-fourths of the
states seek to overrule Roe or Heller, they should expect pushback.
Rebellion and protest are baked into the polity, and taking away previously
granted rights is a convenient way to stimulate opposition against state
action.70

IV. WHY COURTS SHOULD HESITATE BEFORE
CIRCUMSCRIBING PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
If past is prologue, Prohibition teaches that courts should be leery
before circumscribing heretofore recognized individual rights upon which
society now relies. Although the argument is handy that overruling Roe
and Heller returns those issues to the states that position fails to mollify the
reliance interests built up by individuals who have no desire to relocate at
the peril of losing something they believe is constitutionally theirs.71 Even
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Prohibition, HISTORY (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition.
Mills, supra, note 39.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
Mills, supra, note 39.
See, e.g., NCC Staff, On this day: Shays’ Rebellion was Thwarted, NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION CENTER (Jan. 25, 2017), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-dayshays-rebellion-was-thwarted; NCC Staff, The Seeds of Revolution: The Stamp Act Protests
in Boston, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Mar. 22, 2016), http://blog.constitution
center.org/2016/03/the-seeds-of-revolution-the-stamp-act-protests-in-boston/;
Abigail
Perkiss, The Language of Protest: Race, Rioting, and The Memory of Ferguson, NATIONAL
CONSTITUTION CENTER (Dec. 3, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/12/thelanguage-of-protest-what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-ferguson/.
71. Christina Cauterucci, Trump Says Without Roe v. Wade, Women Could Just Visit
Other States for Abortions, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
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“[f]or sound adherents of originalism, stare decisis kicks in when erroneous
precedents—even outrageously erroneous precedents—have created real
reliance interests that must be taken into account as a matter of proper
judicial power and due process.”72
Professor Akhil Reed Amar summarized how reliance on an individual
right—even one resting on faulty constitutional principles—demands fealty
by courts when the temptation presents itself to correct the prior case:
Even those judges and scholars who start with precedents need to
understand the theory of precedent itself. Most of today’s most
important constitutional precedents come from the Warren Court.
But the Warren Court itself tossed a vast number of precedents out
the window—on Jim Crow, on malapportionment, on incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, on organized prayer in the schools, on free
speech, and on other topics besides. Was the Warren Court wrong
to do this? Any principled advocate of precedent must honestly
confront this question, yet almost none of our modern jurists or
scholars has done so.
Here is my answer: The Warren Court did the right thing because
the earlier cases were wrong as an original matter. The
Constitution really does promise free speech, a right to an equal
vote, racial equality, religious equality, and protection against
violation by state governments of basic fundamental rights. No
proper reliance interests stood in the way of righting earlier judicial
wrongs and giving American citizens what the Constitution in fact
promised them. Precedent itself requires taking the Warren Court
seriously, and taking that Court seriously requires taking the
Constitution itself seriously, which the Warren Court generally did,
contrary to the view of its many uninformed critics, then and
now.73
Chief Justice Earl Warren was no longer on the Court by the time of Roe,
and he had little to do with Heller. But the idea is axiomatic that courts
must confront before overturning precedent the due-process interest of
settled expectations of individual rights.
The Supreme Court has defined reliance as “the cost of a rule’s
repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the
rule’s continued application.”74 With the same holding true for the right to
possess a firearm at home in self-defense, “[t]he Constitution serves human
values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured,
2016/11/14/trump_says_without_roe_v_wade_women_could_just_visit_other_states_for_ab
ortions.html.
72. Amar, supra, note 10.
73. Amar, supra, note 10.
74. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered
their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.”75 To suggest
otherwise for either Heller or Roe is to ignore the documented plight of
those impacted, often impecunious individuals unable to afford travel or
secure alternative means to enjoy previously recognized rights.76
To measure the cost on reliance, courts reviewing the circumscription
of individual rights should fall back to what occurred during Prohibition
when reliance interests were ignored. Advocates of individual rights
should press how Prohibition ushered in an era of increased crime, rising
costs to administer justice, willful disobedience by individuals and state
actors, and a disproportionate impact on poor communities whose reliance
interests are most chronic. Beyond articulating the documented lessons
from Prohibition, advocates should prepare evidence to demonstrate how
even the noblest of intentions can go awry when individual rights are
threatened. Evidence of what self-help behavior may occur and how that
behavior could evolve over a prolonged period of time will assist courts in
understanding how feelings of entitlement to rights and desperation over
their loss can produce deleterious efforts on society writ large. Even if the
individual right is constitutionally suspect, once a right is recognized and
given to individuals, reliance builds and expectations change. Expectations
shape social norms and act as figurative arms-control agreements to
prevent chaos.77 When the legal premise behind those expectations falters,
either the conduct continues unlawfully or the social norms careen into
chaotic tendencies until the status quo is reset. But, as Prohibition teaches,
some expectations and reliance interests are never reset. Remembering a
right once retained reflexively steers the polity back to the former
homeostasis.

V. CONCLUSION
When confronted with the prospect of a revolving door of individual
rights, the Supreme Court made its positon clear: “Liberty finds no refuge
in a jurisprudence of doubt.”78 Returning to the question of when an
individual can feel secure in his or her rights, the answer should always be
when a reliance interest develops. It is no constitutional accident that
Lochner and Plessy represent the only cases in which a conceivable
argument develops that the Supreme Court upset settled expectations on
individual rights. But, in those cases, the settled expectations benefited
75. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
76. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016).
77. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Refounding Father, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
(June 5, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/06/05/justice-stevens-refoundingfather/ (“Throughout American history, citizens have participated in the equivalent of an
arms control agreement, in which they engage in a kind of mutual forbearance with respect
to constitutional change.”).
78. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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collective-institutional interests to the detriment of individual welfare. For
those hounding to overturn Roe and Heller, the best example of what could
happen to society lies in Prohibition. The self-perceived right and
entitlement to booze became the genesis for lawbreaking and cottage
industries of unlawful conduct. Lawyers are the vanguard to prevent
history from repeating itself. Once people believe they have a right and
rely on that right to organize conduct, purging that right exacts a toll on
society. The toll is far greater than the moral or political justification to
preclude someone from drinking, having an abortion, or owning a weapon.
Advocates in favor of individual rights should present evidence about why
restraint over valor is prudent before overruling precedent that recognizes
individual freedoms and liberties. By winning in court, society loses in the
aggregate when rights are trampled.

